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Article 4

NOTES

TERRORIST KIDNAPPING
OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL

Although Senator Joseph McCarthy charged in 1950 that "dilettante
diplomats" do their fighting for us "with kid gloves in perfumed drawing rooms," 1 our diplomatic agents have traditionally faced substantial
hazards while serving our country abroad. This has been especially true
in areas of political instability or upheaval, such as Latin America. 2
Indeed, in the past two years, the issue of providing adequate protection for our diplomats has received considerable attention in the wake
of a series of kidnappings of government personnel by urban guerillas.
Principally responsible for these abductions have been local extremist
groups, who thereby attempt to embarrass and undermine support for
their nation's government. While related to aerial hijacking, this new
form of political terrorism impairs the orderly conduct of diplomacy
among nations and thus threatens international relations. Moreover,
these abductions raise the issue of the degree of protection to which a
diplomat in this situation is entitled as a matter of international law
and the extent to which this obligation may conflict with practical considerations of internal security within the receiving state.

1. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1950, at 4, col. 2.
2. C. WILSON, DIPLOATIC

PRmI

GES AND

Imiurrias 51-62 (1967)

contains a de-

tailed listing of American diplomatic and consular personnel killed or assaulted
abroad from 1946 through 1967.
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I
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATIC AGENTS

In general, the duty of a receiving state toward aliens is governed by
its municipal laws and is not regarded as an element of international
law.3 Diplomatic agents, on the other hand, by custom "antedating perhaps all other rules of international law," 4 have been accorded special
privileges and immunities by the receiving state. 5 The historical basis
for these, clearly, was necessity; if any negotiation at all were to take
place, the diplomat's security had to be safeguarded, particularly when
the prevailing attitude towards foreigners was one of fear and distrust.
The Greeks, therefore, regarded the inviolability of diplomatic agents as
a fundamental principle; 6 the Romans considered an injury to the person of the ambassador an infraction of the jus gentium7 and invoked
religious sanctions as protection for the diplomat.8
During the Middle Ages, the custom of diplomatic inviolability was
continued, 9 although ambassadors became more the personal messengers
of princes than formal representatives of states. As relations between nations continued to grow, permanent diplomatic missions were established,

3. W. BisHop, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 745 (3rd ed. 1971). Nonetheless, when the treatment of an alien falls below a nebulous "minimum standard,"
the receiving state violates an international legal interest of the state of the alien's
nationality. See generally H. STEINER & D. VACTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS
275 ff. (1968).
4. C. FENWIcK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 561 (4th ed. 1965).
5. Agents were sent on important missions by the kings of the Hittites, Babylonians,
Assyrians, Hebrews, and Egyptians, and were accorded a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the records of ancient China and India show that ambassadors of neighboring lands were regarded as immune from local jurisdiction. Barnes, Diplomatic Immunity from Local Jurisdiction,43 DEPT STATE BULL. 173-74 (1960). See also note 37
infra.
6. H. GRoTnus, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEAcE 439 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925).

7. Jus gentium was the term applied to that portion of the Roman law applicable
to citizens and non-citizens alike, as distinguished from the jus civile which was applicable only to citizens of Rome. See generally, R. MELVILLE, ROMAN LAW (3rd ed.
1921).
8. Cicero expressed the Roman attitude when he stated:
The inviolability of ambassadors is protected both by divine and human
law; they are sacred and respected so as to be inviolable not only when in an
allied country but also whenever they happen to be in forces of the enemy.
Barnes, supra note 5, at 174.
9. Both the Gothic and Saxon laws provided a high degree of protection for the
diplomatic representative. Later, papal agents were imparted great respect by virtue
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and custom developed into conventional practice. 10
The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ended the Hundred Years' War and
confirmed the principle of a balance of power between European nations.
Thus, states were obliged to keep watch on each other, and to facilitate
this task, legations were established on each other's soil. The earliest
legislation on diplomatic immunity appeared at this time, but it was
merely an attempt to codify customary practice with respect to the inviolability of the diplomat's person. 1 A subsequent British statute, the
historic Act of Anne,12 introduced the concept of jurisdictional immunity
from legal process for a diplomat in the host state.'3
The Industrial Revolution effectively ended the isolation of states
and necessitated regular relations between them. It soon became obvious
that agreement would have to be reached on universally binding rules
concerning the rights due foreign diplomats. 14 At the Congress of Vienna
in 1815, an attempt was made "to prevent in the future inconveniences

of the authority of the Pope, and this encouraged a similarly high standard of treatment for agents of states. Id.
10. See H. GROTIUS, supra note 6, at 438-449.
11. In 1651, the Netherlands forbade "offending, damaging, injuring by word, act
or manner, the ambassadors, residents, agents or other ministers . . . or [doing] them
injury or insult." Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 26 Am. J. INT'L. LAW 19, 94 (Supp. 1932)
[hereinafter cited as Harvard Draft].
12. Act of Parliament for Preserving the Privileges of Ambassadors and Other Publick Ministers of Foreign Princes and States, 7 Anne ch. 12, 1 BRIT. FOR. STATE PAPERS

903 (1708). The Act of 1708 was repealed by the Diplomatic Privileges Act of 1964,
whose purpose was to conform United Kingdom law regarding diplomatic privileges
and immunities with the Vienna Convention, infra note 26. See 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 892-93 (2nd ed. 1970).

Whether or not diplomatic immunity from a state's exercise of its jurisdiction
existed at common law prior to the Act of Anne is uncertain and has been much
debated by the authorities. For citations to the opposing viewpoints, see C. WILSON,
supra note 2, at 27, n. 8. The personal inviolability of the diplomat at common law
was clearly recognized. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 789 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955). However, this has never been specifically enacted into law in Great
Britain, apparently on the theory that the usual processes of British criminal law
were sufficient to protect him. Lyons, Personal Immunities of Diplomatic Agents, 31
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L LAW 299, 305 (1954).

13. Though the term "immunity," broadly used, would subsume "inviolability,"
in the sense that the diplomat is or should be "immune" from physical harm or detention in the receiving state, here the term will be used more restrictively to denote
immunity from a state's exercise of its legal jurisdiction.
14. [Mlarked political inequalities, supported by the ambition of governments and the personal vanity of princes, brought about a constant struggle
for the enhancement of national prestige by the relative position accorded to
the diplomatic representatives of the state . . . . The matter was further

complicated by the different functions performed by diplomatic agents.
C. FENWICK, supra note 4, at 556-57.
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which have frequently occurred, and which may still occur, from the
claims of precedence among the different diplomatic characters"' 5 by
dividing them into three classes and establishing an order of precedence
within each class based on seniority.'9 Although the Vienna Regulation,
as it came to be known, was signed by only eight European powers, it
1
became universal practice. 7
The next major effort to codify the rights and privileges of diplomatic
officers was made in 1928 at the Sixth International Conference of
American States, held in Havana, Cuba. The resulting agreement,' 8
while limited to the American republics, was broader than the Vienna
Regulation of a century before,' 9 but still failed to completely state the
privileges and immunities of all members of the mission or the rights
and duties of the sending and receiving states.
At its first meeting in 1949, the International Law Commission pro-

visionally selected fourteen topics as suitable for codification, one of
which was "diplomatic intercourse and immunities." 20 The General
Assembly, by resolution, thereafter requested the Commission to give
priority to this topic, 2' and in 1954, the Commission decided to begin

15. Id. at 557.
16. The three classes were: 1) ambassadors, who alone could represent their
sovereign; 2) ministers, who were accredited to sovereigns; and 3) charges d'affaires,
who were accredited to ministers for foreign affairs. At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle,
in 1818, another class of ministers, also accredited to sovereigns but of lower rank,
was created-this class intended for the representatives of smaller states. Id.
17. REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON DIPLOiATIc INTERCOURSE AND IMMUNITIEs, 2 MARCH-14 APRIL, 1961 at 2
(1962) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Report].
18. Convention Regarding Diplomatic Officers, adopted by the Sixth International
American Conference, Feb. 20, 1928, 47 Stat. 1976 (1933), T.S. No. 843, 155 L.N.T.S. 259
[hereinafter cited as Havana Convention].
19. The Havana Convention provided:
Article 2.
Diplomatic officers are classed as ordinary and extraordinary.
Those who permanently represent the Government of one State before that
of another [are ordinary).
Those entrusted with a special mission or those who are accredited to
represent the Government in international conferences and congresses or
other international bodies are extraordinary.
Article 9.

Extraordinary diplomatic officers enjoy the same prerogatives and immunities as ordinary ones.
20. Summary Records of the First Session of the International Law Commission 12
April 9-June 1949, [1949] Y.B. INT'L L. Cohnt'N 9, 49, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/S 1/Rev.1

(1956).
21. GA. Res. 685, 7 U.N. GAOR 312, U.N. Doc. A/Res/19 (1952). The Resolution
also expressed the General Assembly's desire for the common observance of "exist.
ing principles of international law" regarding the treatment of diplomatic repre.

sentatives. U.S. Report, supra note 17, at 1.
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work on the project.22 Four years later, the Commission adopted fortyfive draft articles and recommended that they be considered by govern-

ments as the basis for a multilateral convention. 23 After studying the
Commission's report

and recommendation,

the General

Assembly

unanimously adopted a resolution which placed the item entitled "Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities" on the provisional agenda for its
next session and invited member states to submit comments on the draft
articles. 24 The following year, the General Assembly convened the con-

ference, appropriately at Vienna, where in 1815 the law of diplomatic
relations had first been formulated. 25 The goal of the conference was:
to examine, in the light of present conditions, the body of law and practice

which has developed since the adoption of the Vienna Regulation of 1815,
and to formulate a comprehensive statement of the rights and privileges of
all members of a diplomatic mission and of their families and private
servants, and the rights and obligations of the State on whose territory they
perform its functions.26

The United Nations Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities of March 2-April 14, 1961, was attended by eighty-one governments. Its product, the landmark Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Re-

22. Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of Its Sixth
Session 3 June-28 July 1954, [1954] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Comm'N 140, 162, U.N. Doc. A/2693
(1960).
23. Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of Its Tenth
Session 28 April-4 July 1958, [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Cos'Y 78, 89-105, U.N. Doc. A/

3895/SER.A/1958lAdd.1 (1958> [hereinafter cited as ILC Report].
24. GA. Res. 1288, 13 U.N. GAOR 459, U.N. Doc. A/Res/1288/XII (1958).
25. GA. Res. 1450, 14 U.N. GAOR 645 at 647, U.N. Doc. A/Res/1450/XIV (1959).
The United States abstained from voting on G.A. Res. 1288, supra note 24, having
"expressed a preference for a codification of international law on the subject, rather
than the formulation of a multilateral convention, principally because it doubted that
a convention would be widely adhered to. . . . [However] the unanimous votes by
which General Assembly Resolutions 1288 (XIII) and 1450 (XIV) were adopted indicated that the convention to be formulated at the Vienna Conference would be one
which would be acceptable to a majority of governments. This likelihood of general
acceptance removed one of the major objections of the United States to a multilateral convention." U.S. Report, supra note 17, at 2.
26. U.S. Report, supra note 17 at 2-3. The Vienna Conference of 1961 was the first
conference of its kind open to all interested parties and the first international conference to consider the issue since the 1815 Congress of Vienna and the subsequent 1818
Protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle. See notes 13-15, supra, and accompanying text.
During the interim of nearly a century and a half, provisions insuring diplomatic
privileges and immunities were usually embodied in bilateral treaties. Several of
these are cited in the Harvard Draft, supra note 11, at 27-30. These rights were
always granted on a reciprocal basis and were rarely defined. For example: "The
diplomatic representatives of each country shall enjoy in the territories of the other

194
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lations, 27 was a comprehensive, multilateral agreement, which codified
and restated the law 28 with regard to the status of the diplomat and all
the members of his staff. 29 For the many contracting states, 0 the treaty

the privileges and immunities derived from generally recognized international law
and usage." General Relations Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Philippines, July 4, 1946, art. II, 61 Stat. (2) 1174 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1568, 7
U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Oct. 22, 1946).
Similarly, by means of equally vague special agreements, protection was extended
to public officials engaged in international activities. For instance, the Covenant of
the League of Nations granted "diplomatic privileges and immunities" to representatives of members of the League when engaged in official business. LFAGuE OF
NATIONS COVENANT, art. 7, para. 4. Similar immunities were granted to judges and
deputy judges of the World Court by I.C.J. STAT., art. 19. U.N. CHARTER, art. 105,
paras. 1-2 provides:
1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the
Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are
necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the
Organization.
Article 105 has been supplemented by the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 (1946). See generally L. GooDRIcl
& E. HAMIBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 620 ff.
(3rd ed. 1969).
Bilateral treaties extending special status to non-diplomats (e.g., members of trade
delegations, economic aid groups, military missions, etc.), however, have been more
specific in defining the particular privileges and immunities granted. Most nations are reluctant to extend full diplomatic prerogatives to these groups in order
to avoid a proliferation of foreign citizens exempt from local laws. A thorough coverage of this subject is provided in C. WitsoN, supra note 2, at 216 ff. Wilson notes
in conclusion that, unlike the situation with regard to diplomats, "there is no full
crystalized body of rules regulating and protecting non-diplomats ....
" Id. at 269.
27. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for signature April 18,
1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, reprinted in 55 At. J. INT'L LAW 1064 (1961) [hereinafter
citel as Vienna Convention].
28. The United States delegation found that "[t]he standard of treatment required by the Vienna Convention conforms, in most respects, to the views of the
United States as to what is or should be required by international law or practice ....
The Convention constitutes an important contribution to the progressive development of international law." U.S. Report, supra note 17, at 34.
29. The Vienna Convention, in addition to delineating the rights of the "diplomatic agent," also provides for the privileges to be granted "members of the administrative and technical staff," "members of the service staff," the "private servant,"
and "members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household."
Each of these categories, except the last, is defined in Article 1.
The immunities and privileges of consular officials are listed in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature April 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261,
reprinted in 57 A*. J. INT'L LAw 995 (1963) (hereinafter cited as Consular Convention].
As a rule, a consular official, unlike a diplomatic agent, is subject to the receiving
state's criminal and civil jurisdiction, except with respect to "acts performed in the
exercise of consular functions." Article 43, para. 1, Consular Convention. However,
Article 40 of the Consular Convention, entitled "Protection of Consular Officers,"
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should at
is, by its terms, law; 31 for non-signatories, the treaty 3articles
2
law.
international
existing
of
persuasive
highly
be
least
The personal inviolability of the diplomat is provided for in Article
29 of the Vienna Convention, which reads:
The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be
liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him
with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack
on his person, freedom, or dignity.

That this provision was considered to be in general accord with "ac33
cepted principles of international law and practice" was borne out by
the fact that the text of Article 2934 was approved by the conference with35
out change from the International Law Commission's draft. Together

provides:

The receiving state shall treat consular officials with due respect and shall
take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom or
dignity.
While this formulation is not identical to that providing for the personal inviolability
of the diplomat, see text accompanying notes 52-33, infra, clearly the abduction
of either a consular official or a diplomatic agent is an equal breach of international
law. See generally, L. LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS 82-83 (1966).
30. At the conclusion of the Conference on April 18, 1961, the Convention was signed
by 45 states, and entered into force under Art. 51, para. 1, when ratified by 22 states
on April 24, 1964. Consent of the U.S. Senate to the Convention was obtained on
September 14, 1965, but the Department of State recommended that the President
not ratify it until Congress passed complementary legislation. Garretson, The Immunities of Representatives of Foreign States, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 67, 68 (1966).
Appropriate legislation was introduced in the 90th Congress, 1st Session, as S.
1577 and passed on June 15, 1967, 113 CONG. REC. 16062. However, the bill failed to
emerge from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, after it had been referred by
the Senate on July 20, 1967, 113 CONG. REc. 19614.
31. Vienna Convention, art. 51, para. 1.
32. "Since the provisions of the Convention thus reflect the considered judgment of
so many states as to the rules which will best meet the needs of governments in the
years ahead, the rules are likely to be accepted in principle and observed in practice
even by those governments wrich fail to becom parties to the Convention." U. S.
Report, supra note 17, at 34.
33. U.S. Report, supra note 17, at 16.
34. In addition to Article 29, providing for absolute personal inviolability, Article
22 provides that "the premises of the mission shall be inviolable." Thus, the Convention omits the traditional exception that the diplomat's personal inviolability is not
infringed if he is injured as a consequence of wilfully placing himself in a dangerous position, U.S. v. Liddle, 26 F. Cas. 936 (No. 15598) (C.C.D. Pa. 1808), or after
first assaulting another, U.S. v. Ortega, 27 F. Cas. 359 (No. 15971) (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1825),
a!f'd 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467 (1825). However, the Commentary to the text of Draft
Article 27, later to become Article 29 of the Vienna Convention, seems to recognize
the implicit presence of these unusual exceptions, stating: "This principle [of personal inviolability] does not exclude in respect of the diplomatic agent . . . measures
of self defense ...." I.L.C. Report, supra note 23, at 97.
35. I.L.C. Report, supra note 23, at 97. Note that Article 29 was originally num-
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with Article 31, providing for diplomatic immunity from criminal and
37
civil suits with three exceptions, 36 and some other subsidiary provisions,
the international standards of diplomatic privilege were thus codified. 38
It is noteworthy that the term "all appropriate steps," appearing in

bered Article 27.
36. The exceptions to immunity from the civil and criminal jurisdiction are:
a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending
State for the purposes of the mission;
b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not
on behalf of the sending State;
c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised
by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.
Art. 31, para. 1, subparas. a,b,c. In relation to the final exception, note Article 42:
"A diplomatic agent shall not in the receiving State practise for personal profit any
professional or commercial activity."
37. The Vienna Convention also provides for the inviolability of the diplomat's
private residence, papers, and property (Art. 30). Further personal immunities include: exemption from obligation to give evidence as a witness (Art. 31, para. 2);
exemption from execution of judgments, except in the three situations in Art. 31,
para. 1, subparas. a,b,c, supra note 35, and then only if "the measures concerned can be
taken without infringing the inviolability of his person or of his residence" (Art. 31,
para. 3); exemption from social security provisions absent any treaties to the contrary (Art. 33); an exemption from taxation with a handful of exceptions concerning the diplomat's personal affairs (Art. 34); and exemption from all personal or
public services and military obligations (Art. 35). Of course, the diplomat is still
subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state (Art. 31, para. 4), and his diplomatic
immunity within the receiving state may be waived by the sending state (Art. 32,
para. 1) .
38. Diplomats have always had immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the host
state. "It seems to be universally recognized that a diplomatic minister is immune
from bodily restraint, i.e., arrest or imprisonment in the country to which he has
been accredited." Bergman v. de Sieves, 71 F.Supp. 334, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1946>, aff'd, 170
F. 2d 360 (2nd Cir. 1948). Nonetheless, diplomats have on occasion been arrested
for purposes of harassment. For detailed examples of such indignities, see C. WILsoN,
supra note 2, at 63 ff.
Of course, diplomats have always been required to voluntarily obey the host
state's laws. See Chief Justice Marshall's well-known dictum in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 139, 3 L*Ed. 287, 294 (1812). See also
4 J. MOORE, A DIGFsT OF INTERNATONAL LAw 678 (1906). Article 41, para. 1, of the
Vienna Convention incorporated this principle, and the Commentary to the Draft
Article of the International Law Commission on personal inviolability, adopted by
the Vienna Conference as Article 29, noted that his inviolability does not exclude
"measures to prevent him from committing crimes or offenses." I.L.C. Report, supra
note 23, at 97. For examples of the sanctions applied by the U.S. State Department
against offending diplomatic officers in this country, see W. Barnes, supra note 5,
at 177.
Traditionally, diplomats have been completely exempt from the receiving state's
civil jurisdiction, though the courts of some states, in the absence of a statute, have
restricted this immunity to areas connected with the diplomat's official duties. For

a collection of decisions evidencing the general trend, see
BY

THE

SECRETARIAT

ON

DIPLOMAIC

INTERCOURsE

AND

MEMORANDUM PREPARED

IMMUNITIs, [1956] 2 Y.B.
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Article 29, is nowhere defined.8 9 Nonetheless, some light may be shed on
the intention of the drafters by an examination of the underlying theoretical framework for granting diplomatic privileges and immunities.
Historically, legal scholars have offered several theories to justify the
grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities. 40 However, the three
theories that have, at different times, gained the greatest acceptance are:
1) the theory of "extraterritoriality," i.e., either that the ambasador is to
be treated as if he were still living in the territory of the sending state,
or that the premises of the diplomat's mission were an extension of the
territory of the sending state; 2) the theory of "personal representation,"
i.e., that the diplomatic mission and its personnel personify or embody
the sending state so that a slight upon the dignity of the diplomat is an
insult to the sovereign he represents; and, 3) the theory of "functional
necessity," i.e., that the diplomat's immunity from local jurisdiction is
necessary to allow nations to carry on international relations with a
minimum of interference.
All three theories have been subject to scholarly criticism, but the
concept of "extraterritoriality" has been most widely condemned. The
criticism has been primarily on the ground that it does not provide any
legal or theoretical basis for diplomatic prerogatives. The theory is, in
fact, only a fiction, and a fiction that today would produce dangerous
consequences if seriously adhered to. "Extraterritoriality" would allow
persons of diplomatic rank unlimited privileges and immunities in the
host country, an exemption which today is not accorded anywhere in

INT'L

L.

COMM'N

129, 164-67, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/98 (1957). The United States dele-

gation to the Vienna Conference, while voting for the three exceptions to complete civil immunity contained in Article 31 of the Convention, noted that they
represented "a significant departure from established [international] practice." U.S.
Report, supra note 17, at 16. Moreover, these exceptions conflict with present U.S.
law entitling diplomatic agents to full immunity. See notes 55-56, infra, and accompanying text.
39. The Commentary to the text of the Draft Article that became Article 29
offers no assistance in this regard, merely stating:
This article confirms the principle of the personal inviolability of the
diplomatic agent. From the receiving State's point of view, this inviolability
implies, as in the case of the mission's premises, the obligation to respect and
to insure respect for, the person of the diplomatic agent. The receiving State
must take all reasonable steps to that end, possibly including the provision of
a special guard where circumstances so required. Being inviolable, the diplomatic agent is exempted from measures that would amount to direct coercion.
This principle does not exclude in respect of the diplomatic agent either
measures of self-defense or, in exceptional circumstances, measures to prevent him from committing crimes or offenses."
I.L.C. Report, supra note 23, at 97.
40. See Harvard Draft, supra note 11, at 26 ff.
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actual practice. However, used in a more restrictive sense, the term offers
no guidance toward determining the rights of the diplomat. Moreover,
the word, which has been so variously defined as to become meaningless, 41 is inherently at odds with reality. It seeks to explain diplomatic immunities on the basis of the absolute independence of states, though
in fact the question of immunity arises only because of the necessity for
diplomatic intercourse, i.e., a mutual realization of the interdependence
of states. 42 Clearly, diplomatic immunities are the cause, not the con43
sequence, of this fiction.
The theory of "personal representation" is also being abandoned by
legal scholars. A shortcoming it shares with "extraterritoriality" is that
in placing a sovereign and his agents entirely beyond the law of the host
state, it is too broad to serve as a realistic basis in formulating a diplomat's rights. On the other hand, the theory is too narrow to be viable in
that it offers no basis for the exemptions granted to diplomats for certain
wholly private acts. 4 4 The concept is also difficult to transpose to modern

times, when sovereign authority has devolved upon "the people," especially in a system such as ours where the sovereign power is shared by executive, legislative and judicial arms of government. Thus, "it might now
be asked: the ambassador is the personification of whom? '45 The most
widely accepted theory is that of "functional necessity," which is based
on the need for orderly relations among states, necessitating a policy of
respect for and non-interference with each other's diplomats.4 6 This

41. Various meanings and applications of the word are listed and analyzed in C.
WILSON, supra note 2, at 12.
42. A recent text succinctly expresses the modern viewpoint:
A diplomat's special position results not from the extension of the territorial jurisdiction of the sending state into the receiving state, but rather
from a grant by the receiving state of a personal exemption from its normal
territorial jurisdiction to the extent that usage has established this as necessay to facilitate international relations.
R. HARMON, THE ART AND PRACTICE OF DIPLOMACY 146 (1971).
43. An incisive discussion of some further shortcomings of the "extraterritoriality"
fiction is found in Preuss, Capacity for Legation and the Theoretical Basis for Diplomnatic Immunity, 10 N.Y.U. L. Q. REv. 179, 182-87 (1932).
44. Preuss, noting these criticisms, id. at 179-81, is nonetheless, unwilling to discard the theory and concludes that immunities for all acts, private and public,
can be explained by combining the theories of personal representation and functional
necessity. Id. at 187.
45. C. WILSON, supra note 2, at 4.
46. The idea of "jurisdictional immunity," like the idea of personal inviolability,
which it followed, "originated in the conviction that the absolute independence of the
diplomatic agent in his dealings with the sovereign to whom he is accredited is
an indispensable condition for the accomplishment of his mission." MEMORANDUM
PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT ON DIPLOMATIC INTERCOURSE AND IMMUNITIES, supra
note 38, at 134.
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theory, which emerged in its modem form from the work of Grotius, 47

has recently grown in importance. One reason was the establishment
and growth of international organizations following World War I, necessitating the grant of diplomatic immunity to thousands of people who
represented neither a "territory" nor a "sovereign." Neither "extraterritoriality" nor "personal representation" were adequate to explain this
development. "Functional necessity" also explained the maintenance
of diplomatic relations between communist and non-communist countries and the preservation of the rights of their respective diplomatic personnel, despite the hostilities engendered by the Cold War. Again,
"extraterritoriality" and "personal representation" offered little guidance
to ascertaining diplomatic prerogatives in the face of deep-seated ideological conflicts and modem security needs.
"Functional necessity" is also in greater accord with the realities of
modern power politics, because, unlike the other theories, it permits
the security and welfare of the host state to be taken into account in
qualifying the rights of diplomats. 48 Under this concept, diplomatic
immunities rest upon what one student of the subject calls "the shifting consideration of conveniences . . . as dictated by the . . . receiving

nation." 49 Therefore, the theory is a dynamic one, capable of accounting for trends and changes of direction. 0

47. Grotius, emphasizing the importance of the diplomat's functions, stated
that "an ambassador ought to be free of all compulsion." H. GROTIus, supra note 6,
at 448.
Grotius lent his authority primarily, however, to the theory of "extraterritoriality."
After discussing precedents, he concluded that ambassadors "were held to be out-

side the limits of the country to which they were accredited. For this reason,
they are not subject to the municipal law of the state within which they are living."
Id. at 443. It has been suggested, though, that this formulation was not meant to
serve as a theoretical basis for diplomatic immunities, but, rather, as legal shorthand to express the position of the diplomat in the receiving state. See Preuss,
supra note 43, at 184, n. 43.
48. Communist nations in particular, although not exclusively, often use "security
considerations" as a reason to restrict and harass diplomatic personnel. See C. WILSON, supra note 2, at 24. A well-known example of national security taking priority
over diplomatic immunity is Rose v. The King, [1947] 3 D.L.R. 618, [1946] Ann. Dig.
161 (No. 76) (King's Bench of Quebec, Canada), in which documents stolen from
the Russian Embassy, that ordinarily would have been privileged, were nonetheless allowed into evidence because they affected national security. See also U.S. v.
Melekh, 190 F.Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
49. C. WILsON, supra note 2, at 24. "Privileges and immunities accorded to diplomats is [sic] not absolute, but related to the agent's duties and dependent upon his
good faith and respect for the rights of the receiving state in discharging them." R.
HARMON, supra note 42, at 146. Clearly, it is the receiving state which determines the

agent's "good faith" and "respect" towards itself.
50. The theory has been attacked on grounds of vagueness, because it fails to indi-
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While the body of the Vienna Convention offers no explicit theoretical
basis for the various rights it recognizes, the fourth paragraph of the
Preamble to the Convention reads:
Realizing that the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to
benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of
diplomatic missions as representing States......

According to a member of the United States delegation to the Vienna
conference, this paragraph represents a compromise between those
delegations favoring the "functional necessity" theory and those supporting the "representative character" (or "personal representative")
theory as a conceptual basis for the Convention.5' The arguments against
a clearer expression in the Preamble of "functional necessity" were,
in essence, that the sending state would then, perhaps, be obliged to
waive diplomatic immunity in certain instances where the receiving state
could establish that a particular diplomatic function did not require
immunity.5 2 As it stands, however, the Preamble is confusing. The reference to "missions as representing States" is the classical formulation of
the "representative character theory, and this leaves the intention of the
drafters somewhat equivocal. Accordingly, it becomes difficult to interpret the meaning of "all appropriate steps," required under Article 29
to be taken by the host state in safeguarding the personal inviolability
of a foreign diplomat. 53

cate how far immunities essential to "the accepted practice of diplomacy" are to be
extended or even, for that matter, what is the accepted practice of diplomacy. C. VILSON, supra note 2, at 22. However, in fact, it seems less vague than other theories that
have been put forward and, also, more soundly based on reality.
51. Kerley, Some Aspects of the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse and
Immunities, 56 AM. J. INT'L LAW 88, 91 (1962). The International Law Commission, in
its Commentary to the Draft Articles, stated that: "The Commission was guided
by [the theory of functional necessity] in solving problems on which practice
gave no clear pointers, while also bearing in mind the representative character
of the head of the mission and of the mission itself." Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, 13
U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, 95, U.N. Doc. A/3859 (1958).
52. Kerley, supra note 51, at 82-94. Article 31 has already made the determination
that the diplomat does not require immunity in three areas of civil law. See note
36 supra. To the extent that the diplomat is amenable to suit in these "private"
areas, of course, his freedom of movement with regard to "public" functions is
impeded.
53. If the "functional necessity" theory is used, the diplomat's inviolability
would have to be secured by all possible means consistent with the receiving state's
welfare. If the "personal representative" theory is adopted, every step, without
exception, would have to be taken to protect the diplomat, and the welfare of
the receiving state, while performing this Convention "obligation," would pre-
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Logically, it would seem that if the diplomat is due a higher degree
of protection than a national, then iny act violative of or infringing upon
his dignity should be punished more severely than would otherwise be
the case. In fact, special laws have been enacted by most nations to pro,
vide special penalties, over and beyond those provided by local criminal
assault statutes, for attacks against foreign ambassadors.5 4 Some of
these enactments also define and extend the diplomat's immunities.
Since the earliest days of the United States, for example, a specific penalty
has been provided by Federal law for assaulting an envoy's person. 55
Also, by statute, diplomatic agents accredited to the United States are
granted much broader immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction
than is afforded by the Vienna Convention. 56

sumably be irrelevant. As stated in an early case:
The person of a public minister is sacred and inviolable. Whoever offers
any violence to him not only affronts the Sovereign he represents, but also
hurts the common safety and well-being of nations; he is guilty of a crime
against the whole world.
Respublica v. Longchamps, 1 Dall. 111, 116, 1 L.Ed. 59, 62 (Ct. of Oyer & Term. at
Phil. 1784). See Part II (c) for an argument that the "functional necessity" theory
represents the more logical approach to deal with the problem of kidnapped diplomatic
personnel.
54. E. SATOW, A GUIDE To DIPLOMATIC PRAGTICE 178 (4th ed. N. Bland 1957).
For a recent listing of such laws, see 7 U.N. LEG. Sm., LAws AND REGULATIONS REGARDING

DIPLOMATIC

AND

CONSULAR

PRIVILEGES

AND

IMMUNrrms,

U.N.

Doc. ST/

LEG/SER.B/7 (1958) and Supp., U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/13 (1963). Of course,
it is unlikely that even extraordinary punishments would deter revolutionaries, in
a repressive state, who were determined to kidnap an ambassador, if the rebels
were subject to execution on capture regardless of whether they perfomed the
abduction or not.
55. The current statute, 18 U.S.C. §112 (1970) provides:
Whoever assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons, or offers violence to the
person of a head of foreign state or foreign government, foreign minister,
ambassador or other public minister, in violation of the law of nations,
shall be fined not more than $5000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years,
or both.
Whoever, in the commission of any such acts, uses a deadly or dangerous
weapon, shall be fined not more than $I0,000, or imprisoned not more than
10 years, or both.
The statute was first passed as the Act of April 30, 1790, ch.9, §28, R.S. §4062 and
covered only the person of a "public minister." It was subsequently broadened to include "ambassador or other public minister" (Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat.
688), and, finally, in 1964, to its present coverage (Act of Aug. 27, 1964, P.L. 88493, §1, 78 Stat. 610). Early in the statute's history, it was held that it is no defense to an indictment for an assault on a foreign minister that the defendant was
ignorant of his public character. U.S. v. Ortega, supra note 35.
56. Compare 22 U.S.C. §§ 252-54 (1970), derived from Act of April 30, 1790,
ch. 9, §§ 25-27, R.S. §§4063-66, which grants diplomats full immunity from civil
and criminal jurisdiction, with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, which grants
full criminal immunity but contains three exceptions to civil immunity. See note 36
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While there is an obligation of special protection due a diplomat,
nevertheless, a state may omit from its criminal law special provisions on
the subject. The general view appears to be that "though a State incurs
some risk in not enacting such provision, it is under no obligation
to do so, provided that it ensures that the normal processes of the
criminal law are adequate and are employed to ensure the punishment of those who commit acts injurious to foreign diplomatic repre57
sentatives."
II
SCOPE OF THE CURRENT PROBLEM

A. Recent Abductions and Their Ramifications
During the twentieth century, the diplomat, despite his supposed
inviolability, has often been subject to abuse. Occasionally, the government of the host state has been responsible, but more frequently,
nationals have acted independently.5 8 Though political kidnapping is
by no means a new tactic, it has never before been a systematic practice.5 9
Apparently, guerillas of all political ideologies, and Marxists in particular, 60 have realized that abducting diplomatic representatives can

supra. "These statutes (22 U.S.C. §§ 252-54) are liberally construed as being declarative of international law of diplomatic immunity." Chief Judge Bazelon in Hellenic
Lines Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978, 980, n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The liberal construction given to these immunity statutes explains why the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and
Consuls" (U.S. Const., Art. iI1, §2) has been invoked only three times in the
nation's history. See W. FORRESTEE ET AL, FEDERAL JURISDICrION AND PROCEDURE 907,
n. 17 (2nd ed. 1970).
The diplomat's servants are also entitled to immunity from the criminal and
civil jurisdiction of the United States, 22 U.S.C. §252 (1970), subject to the limitedr
exceptions of 22 U.S.C. §254 (1970). Article 37, para. 4, of the Vienna Convention,
recognizes privileges and immunities for private servants of the diplomat only to the
extent these are specifically granted by the receiving state.
57. C. HuRsr, INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE CoLLCrED PAPERS OF SIR CECIL HURSr 18182 (1950). See also E. SATOw, supra note 54, at 178.
58. C. WILSON, supra note 2, at 55.
59. One theory correlates the increase in political kidnappings with the fall into
disrepute of the Guevara-Debray theory of revolution, emphasizing guerilla activity
in the jungles and mountains surrounding the cities, and the consequent shift in
focus of the revolutionary struggle to the major urban centers. O'Mara, Snatching
the Diplomats, 210 NATION 518, 519 (May 4, 1970).
60. "Diplomat snatching" is by no means limited to left-wing revolutionaries. For
instance, two celebrated cases last year were the seizure of a West German consul
by Spanish Basque nationalists, note 64 infra, and the seizure of the British Trade
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be a highly effective weapon in their war against usually superior
military and police forces. 61
The brutal inaugural of the current wave of diplomat kidnappings
was the 1968 seizure and murder of United States Ambassador John
Gordon Mein by Guatemalan terrorists.6 2 However, the tactic did not
become widespread until the kidnapping of United States Ambassador
C. Burke Elbrick in Brazil a year later and the successful ransoming
of fifteen jailed radicals for his life. 63 In the ensuing two years, abductions occurred not only in Latin American countries, principally, Uru,
guay, Brazil, Argentina, and Guatemala, but in such other areas as
Spain,6 4 Canada, 65 and Turkey.66 This demonstrated that political kidnapping, like aerial hijacking, was a weapon that could be employed
indiscriminately against democratic governments and authoritarian
regimes alike.

Commissioner by French-Canadian separatists, note 65 infra.
61. See note 54 supra.
62. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1968, at 1, col. 2. Urban guerillas in Guatemala were also
responsible that year for the murder of two U.S. military attaches, N.Y. Times, Jan.
17, 1968, at 1, col. 4, and in 1970, for the murder of West German Ambassador Karl
von Spreti, after the Government refused to release a group of political prisoners as
ransom for his life. N.Y. Times, April 6, 1970, at 1, col. 6.
63. N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1969, at 1, col. 6. Within little more than a year after the
ransoming of Elbrick, three other diplomats, representing Switzerland, Japan, and
again, the United States, were kidnapped by Brazilian terrorists and were freed only
after 130 left-wing guerillas held by Brazilian authorities were released. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 17, 1971, at 8, col. 1.
64. A West German consul to Spain was kidnapped by Basque nationalists, in connection with a trial of 15 Basque separatists by the Franco regime and was released
5 days later. N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1970, at 1, col. 6. While there was no indication at
the time that the kidnappers had received any special assurances as to the outcome
of the trial, the court's sentence was substantially reduced by Generalissimo Franco
a week after the consul's release. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
65. On October 5, 1970, a cell of Canadian revolutionaries, members of the Quebec
Liberation Front, kidnapped James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner, and held
him captive for 59 days before his negotiated release. During this period, another
extremist group of French Canadians kidnapped Pierre Laporte, Minister of Labor
and Immigration in the Quebec Provincial Government, and strangled him to death,
apparently because the first group's demands for $500,000 ransom and the release of
"political prisoners" were not met. These incidents resulted in Prime Minister
Trudeau invoking the War Measures Act, a stringent emergency power, and sending
federal troops to Quebec. The Front was also outlawed. N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1971,
at 1, col. 1.

66. On May 17, 1971, members of an extremist group calling itself the Turkish
People's Liberation Army, seized the Israeli Consul-General, Ephraim Elrom, and
threatened to execute him unless imprisoned members of the group were freed.
When the Turkish Government rejected their demands, Elrom was shot to death
by his kidnappers. The incident was the third in a series of abductions of foreigners
in Turkey in 1971 and the first culminating in the death of the hostage. N.Y. Times,
May 23, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
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Unquestionably, one of the terrorists' primary goals in kidnapping
diplomats has been to use them as pawns for barter to obtain the release of political prisoners. At first, it was believed the objective was
to free only captured guerilla leaders and fellow terrorists, but this
has not always been the case. For example, in August 1970, the Tupamaro
terrorists of Uruguay demanded the freedom of 150 persons convicted,
not of political offenses, but of common crimes, in return for the
life of a United States' advisor to the government of Uruguay.0 7
Guerillas have also demanded financial ransom, 08 but the increasingly inflated and unrealistic demands for money and prisoner release 69 underscore that the aim of the terrorists is not only to procure these, but equally, to harass the government they desire to overthrow. Invariably, the diplomats seized have represented nations with
which the host state has important ties, such as treaty alliances and
70
investments.
In the words of a young Brazilian terrorist, himself involved in
several political kidnappings:
We orient our armed actions in such a way as to make them politically
profitable. For instance, the kidnapping of a foreign diplomat creates political

problems for the regime. Either the regime agrees . . . not to give in and

allows the diplomat to be killed-which creates difficulties with the foreign

power the diplomat represents . . . or the regime meets the demands of the

kidnappers and the diplomat is set free; then the army and the police
criticize the leniency of the Government, and that creates dissension within
the regime.71

67. Under Uruguayan law, however, the President did not have the power to procure
the prisoners' release, and when the Government rejected the terrorist demands,
the advisor, Dan A. Mitrione, was shot to death. U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 24,
1970, at 22.
68. For example, the Tupamaros demanded 1 million dollars ransom apiece for
the lives of Brazilian Consul-General to Uruguay Aloysio Dias Gomide, and Claude
Fly, an American agronomist, both seized toward the end of 1970. Gomide was
released after his wife paid $20,000, which she collected during a fund-raising tour
of Brazil. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1971, at 4, col. 4. Fly was released without any payment after seven months' captivity when he suffered a heart attack and his captors
feared he might die in their hands. N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1971, at 9, col. 1. Throughout, the Uruguayan Government refused to bargain with the guerillas.
69. In order to obtain the safe release of Swiss Ambassador Giovanni Bucher, the
Brazilian Government released 70 prisoners, a substantial increase over the 15 prisoners
obtained by the terrorists from the same government for the release of the first
diplomat to be kidnapped in Brazil, U.S. Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 17, 1971, at 1, col. 2. The Brazilian Government did, however, reject 22 names
on the original list of prisoners to be released, refusing to free anyone convicted
or accused of "serious crimes," a position accepted by the terrorists, who released
Ambassador Bucher on those terms. Newsweek, Jan. 25, 1971, at 44.
70. The countries whose diplomats and consuls have been most involved in the
reported abductions are the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany.
71. de Gramont, How One Pleasant, Scholarly Young Man From Brazil Became a
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When the terrorists' primary goal has been only to publicize their
grievances or shame the authorities, diplomatic personnel have been
released unharmed following rejection of the kidnappers' demands. For
example, when four United States airmen were abducted in Turkey in
March 1971, the Turkish Government rejected a demand for $400,000
ransom, and leftist spokesmen agreed that the airmen would not be
killed, stating: "The kidnappers have accomplished their purpose . . .
They have disgraced the Government, shown up police incompetence,
stirred up student violence. They would only lose in public opinion by
72
killing the Americans."
Although these airmen were soon freed, refusal to negotiate with the
guerillas can be a dangerous course of action, and tragic consequences
have occasionally resulted. Only three months after the four United
States airmen were released unharmed in Turkey, for instance, the
Israeli Consul General was seized and murdered by members of the
same extremist group, following a rejection of their demands by the
73
Turkish Government.
The abductions have created numerous repercussions, both within
the countries where they have taken place and without. Not only have
large numbers of released terrorists filtered back across the border to
reinforce the guerillas, 7 4 but reprisals launched by the affected governments against the revolutionaries and suspected supporters result in
new waves of local repression.75 Economic effects felt locally include a
drying-up of the tourist trade70 and a reluctance of foreign investors to
77
aid national industry.

Internationally, these kidnappings often strain relations between the
nations involved. For example, when West Germany's ambassador to
Guatemala was murdered by terrorists in April 1969, following Guatemala's refusal to release twenty-two prisoners, West Germany immedi-

Kidnapping, Gun-Toting, Bombing Revolutionary, N.Y. Times Magazine, Nov. 15,

1970, at 43, 140.
72. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
73. See note 66 supra. On March 26, 1972, three radar technicians, a Canadian and
two Britons, working for NA.T.O. at a Turkish Air Force base, were seized by
leftist terrorists. They were held as barter for the release of three extremists who were
condemned to death by a martial law court for the murder of Consul-General Elrom.
The hostages were murdered by their abductors when the Turkish Government flatly
refused to bargain. The terrorists were themselves slain when the police dosed in
on their hideout. N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
74. See note 71 supra, at 136.
75. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1970, §4 (The Week in Review) at 5, col. 5.
76. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1971, at 3, col. 3.
77. U.S. News & World Report, August 24, 1970, at 22.
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ately recalled its -staff from Guatemala City and advised Guatemala's
ambassador to leave Bonn.78 While such consequences do not invariably
follow,7 9 a government which refuses to accede to terrorist demands and
risks the life of an innocent diplomatic hostage unquestionably exposes
itself to censure.
B. Principles of State Responsibility
The national and international reactions provoked by these kidnappings disrupt the host state's government internally and discredit it
in the eyes of the world, but these sanctions, while powerful, are of an
informal nature. In a formal sense, however, can the acts of the revolutionaries be legally imputed to the government of the host state under
principles of international responsibility by an arbitral or adjudicatory
tribunal?
In general, a state is obliged to give aliens within its boundaries the
same personal protection accorded its own citizens.80 Traditionally, an
alien who was injured by a private person could pursue his remedies,
like an ordinary citizen, only against that person; the state became implicated only if the actor was an agent of the state or if the state denied
the alien justice either by not affording a remedy or by failing to enforce it.81 The acts of insurgents or rioters were considered the same
as acts of private individuals and, similarly, could not be imputed to the
state. Again, state responsibility was limited to providing access to its civil
and criminal courts for appropriate redress;8 2 since the state would bear

78. US. News & World Report, April 20, 1970, at 22.
79. For example, in the Mitrione incident, note 67 and accompanying text, a State
Department spokesman explained following the abductee's murder, that the United
States had not pressured Uruguay in any way to meet the terrorists' demands because
it felt this might create "great risks for all Americans overseas" by encouraging further kidnappings. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1970, at 3, col. 6. Similarly, the Israeli Government expessed no displeasure over Turkish handling of the Elrom incident, note 66
supra, because Turkey displayed the firmness that the Israelis themselves had urged
other governments to adopt against Arab plane hijackers and other terrorists. N.Y.
Times, May 24, 1971, at 6, col. 2.
80. Each country is bound to give to the nationals of another country in its
territory the benefit of the same laws, the same administration, the same protection, and the same redress for injury which it gives to its own citizens,
and neither more nor less: provided the protection which the country gives
to its own citizens conforms to the established standard of civilization.
Secretary of State Elihu Root, quoted in W. Bishop, supra note 3, at 750.
81. Id. at 744.
82. 1 L. OPPENHmEM, supra note 12, at 367. The author, id., notes:

[T]he responsibility of States does not involve the duty to repair the losses

1972]

Terrorist Kidnapping

no liability for the acts of private persons, there would, of course, be no
duty on the state to pay damages for the acts if the offenders themselves
were unable to do so.83
An exception to the traditional rule was recognized where a state had
been negligent in failing to take reasonable precautions to maintain in4
ternal order and had thereby jeopardized the safety of the alien. Another widely-recognized exception was reserved for the case of a successful insurrection, in which event the state's new government was held
liable for injuries to an alien if these resulted from measures taken by
the former insurgents.8 5 There was even authority for the proposition
that a state should make reparation, whether or not it is inculpated,
when violence was directed against the alien as such.86 Several states
have in fact paid damages for losses of this nature, but political reasons
and not a sense of obligation under international law may well have been
the motivation. 87 However, at least one authority has commented that

which foreign subjects have sustained through acts of insurgents and rioters,
provided due diligence was exercised by the State concerned. Individuals who
enter foreign territory must take the risk of an outbreak of insurrections and
riots no less than the risk of the outbreak of other calamities.
83. "The reparation provided to an alien or to the state of which he is a national
for the wrong which has been done to him is, in the generality of cases, damages."
Baxter, Reflections on Codification in Light of the International Law of State
Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 16 Svst. L. REv. 745, 750 (1965)
84. See, e.g., Garcia Amador, International Responsibility, [1958] 2 Y. B. ITr'L L.
COMM'N 47, 72, U.N. Doc. A/CNA/1l1 (1958). Note the difficulty, under the traditional view, in distinguishing between when the breakdown in internal order is
attributable to the state and when it is beyond the power of the state to prevent.
In the latter case, "the state cannot have imputed to it the violent acts of revolutionaries who have escaped beyond its responsible control." 2 D. O'CONNELm, supra
note 12, at 966.
85. Amador, supra note 84, at 72.
86. See, e.g., Sarropoulos v. Bulgarian State, [1927-28] Ann. Dig. 245 (No. 162> (GrecoBulgarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 1927), which stated that the principle is one
"recognised by the great majority of writers ... and by international jurisprudence."
More recently, however, the World Court held that a state cannot be held liable
for an injury suffered by an alien merely because the injury occurred within the
state's territory. The Court said:
It is clear that knowledge of the minelaying cannot be imputed to the
Albanian Government by reason merely of the fact that a minefield discovered in Albanian territorial waters caused the explosion of which the British
warships were victims . . . This fact, by itself and apart from other circumstances, neither involves prima facie responsibility nor shifts the burden of
proof.
Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 1, 18.
87. 1 L. Os'ENHmam, supra note 12, at 368. For example, the Israeli Government
acknowledged responsibility for the murder of Count Folke Bernadette, United Nations
mediator in the Palestine dispute, by Jewish terrorists in 1948, despite the fact that
the Government was in no way implicated in the assassination. In fact, the Government had not at that point even been recognized and was only in de facto control of
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"the emphasis in modern jurisprudence ... is in the direction of liabil
ity without fault. . . If the State claims plenary internal jurisdiction,
88
it must incur primary responsibility."
The theory of "strict liability" seems especially appropriate for diplomatic personnel, who, by custom and international law, are entitled to
special protection.8 9 Even the traditional rule took account of the elevated status of diplomats by raising a rebuttable presumption of state
responsibility when harm befell them. 90 The concept may even have been
embodied in the Vienna Convention, for it states: "[The diplomat] shall
not be liable to any form of arrest or detention" -the sentence not
specifying by whom the diplomatic agent shall not be arrested or detained. The language, while ambiguous, probably does not intend to
establish this concept as a solid doctrine of international law, however,
at least in the area of diplomatic intercourse and immunities.9 1 Not only
have a majority of writers on the subject rejected the approach of strict
liability for injury to aliens generally, 92 but the Special Rapporteur on
this subject for the International Law Commission, which drafted the
Convention, has done so as well. 93

the area where the shooting occurred. Wright, Responsibility for Injuries to United
Nations Officials, 43 Ams J. INT'L LAW 95, 99-100 (1949).
88. 2 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 943 and citations appended.
89. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
90. The presumption was rebuttable by a showing that the state had exercised the
degree of diligence in protecting the official which his position required. Wright,
supra note 87, at 98. O'Connell notes that the only practical distinction between
the state being liable or a private tortfeasor being liable is that the claimant can
demand redress from the state in the former case "instad of pursuing a man
of straw." 2 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 12, at 942. This approach overlooks the fact
that, historically, when a diplomat was injured, the sending government could
demand reparations not only for indemnification of the individual and his family,
but for the injured prestige of the sending state. Unrealistic demands in this very
situation, in fact, often led to war. See Wright, supra note 87, at 102-03.
91. This issue was not discussed at the Vienna Conference, and no reported cases
to date have grappled with the interpretation of Article 29.
92. See authorities cited in I L. OPPENnmf, supra note 12, at 367-68. A relatively
recent convention on "The International Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens," prepared under the auspices of Harvard Law School, failed to accept strict
liability also, holding a state liable only "for an act or omission which, under international law, is wrongful, attributable to that State, and causes an injury to an
alien." With regard to an unsuccessful revolution or insurrection, "an act or omission
of an organ, agency, official or employee of a revolutionary or insurrectionary group
is not, for the purposes of this Convention, attributable to the State." Sohn & Baxter,
Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 Am J.
INT'L LAw

545, 548, 577 (1961).

93. Between the years 1956-61, the International Law Commission's Special Rapporteur on the subject of "State Responsibility", Garcia Amador, prepared six drafts
on the more limited topic of "The Responsibility of States for Damage Caused to
the Person or Property of Aliens", each of which also rejected this approach. The
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The general lack of support for the idea of strict liability for injury
to aliens is probably due to the fact that in the context of international
relations, and especially with regard to diplomats, it has little relevance.
-Its social policy - to shift the burden of loss to the party best able to bear
it94 - is not pertinent here, for the countries within whose borders these
incidents have occurred are almost invariably poorer and, therefore, less
able to bear the burden of reparations than the sending state. 95
Even beyond this consideration, though, money damages make little
sense. Viewed as compensatory damages, they seem an unsatisfactory
and inadequate means of "making whole" the sending state. Viewed as
punitive damages, thcey seem quite ineffective as a deterrent compared
to the damage inflicted on the receiving nation's economy by, for example, the reluctance of tourists to visit the country or of investors to
contribute capital to national industry, following a series of diplomatic
abductions.9 6 In short, the stigma attached to these kidnappings lies in
the political instability these acts manifest to the world, not in a breach
97
of international obligations.
m
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
How, then, are diplomats to be protected from a tactic which host
governments are unable, though not unwilling, to combat? Three types

drafts will be found at: [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CONIN'N 173, U.N. Doc. A/CNA/96
(1956); [1957] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Cozamt'N 104, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/106 (1957);
[1958] 2 Y.B. INTnL L. Copta'N 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/111 (1958); [1959] 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMMt'N 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/119 (1959); [1960] 2 Y.B. INV'L LAw COm'N 41, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/125 (1960); [1961] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, U.N. Doc. A/CNA/134
(1961). The Commission dropped the subject in 1963, "not anxious to start work on a
topic which gave every indication of being ideologically controversial" in many re-

spects. Baxter, supra note 83, at 746.
94. W. PRossFR, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW

OF TORTS

494 (4th ed. 1971).

95. See note 70, supra.
96. See notes 76-77 supra.

97. The lack of agreement between nations as to the alien's precise position or
the extent of the receiving state's liability for injuries to him necessarily renders
tenuous any discussion of the subject. The fact that the law of state responsibility
for injuries to aliens is now one of academic (more than of practical concern is
reflected in the "tremendous diminution in the number of adjudicated international
cases in this area as well as in the number of peaceful settlements of claims on the
diplomatic level in conformity with what is assumed to be the law." Baxter, supra
note 83, at 756.
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of solutions are plausible:
A) A diplomatic solution envisaging a multilateral pact which would
deny asylum to both kidnappers and any released prisoners;
B) Short-term measures chiefly involving increased security; and
C) Adoption of a uniform policy among victimized governments of
refusing to bargain with terrorists.
A. Diplomatic Solution
Since the kidnapping of diplomatic personnel has occurred with greatest frequency in Latin America, joint action by all governments party to
the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) has been proposed. An
international agreement was suggested to the effect that no nation would
give refuge to the abductors of diplomats or to those released from jail
as ransom for the hostage.98
When the issue was raised at the 1970 meeting of the O.A.S., however,
some governments, notably Chile and Mexico, felt that such an agreement would infringe on the traditional Latin American principle of
political asylum as codified by a number of inter-American treaties 9
The meeting finally adopted a compromise resolution, sponsored by the
United States, that condemned terrorism, political kidnapping, and extortion as "crimes against humanity and the principles of international
relations" 1°° and further called on the Inter-American Juridical Committee to prepare a draft treaty that would declare kidnappings of foreign
diplomats to be international crimes analogous to air piracy and, thus,

98. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1970, at 2, col. 3.
99. See, e.g., the Inter-American Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, signed Feb. 20,
1928, 132 L.N.T.S. 323, 22 Au. J. INT'L LAW 158 (Supp. 1928) ; Final Act of the Seventh
International Conference of American States, signed Dec. 26, 1933, in 6 M. HUDSON,
INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 607 (1937), 28 Au. J. INT'L LAW 70 (Supp. 1933); and
the Inter-American Convention on Diplomatic Asylum, signed Mar. 28, 1954, 161
BRaIT. FOR. STATE PAPERS 570 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1954 Convention].
This last treaty was an effort to clarify rights and duties concerning the privilege
of asylum. The granting state was given the right to request that the refugee "be
allowed to depart for foreign territory, and the territorial state is under obligation
to grant immediately, except in case of force majeure, the necessary guarantees ...
as well as the corresponding safe conduct." 1954 Convention, art. 12. See generally
C RONNING, LAW AND POLITICS IN INTER-AMERICN DIPLOMACY 89 ff. (1963).
100. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1970, at 2, col. 3.
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not subject to political immunities. 10 1
The convention was subsequently written and approved by the 11nation Inter-American Juridical Committee 10 2 and was submitted for
approval in early 1971 to a conference of Western Hemisphere foreign
ministers. The draft's most controversial provision called for the extradition of all those accused of political terrorism, terming all terrorist
acts "common" crimes rather than "political" crimes. This designation
would bring such acts within the provision of the Inter-American Convention on Diplomatic Asylum of 1954, currently in force, which denies
the right of asylum to those on trial for or convicted of "common"
03
crimes.1
Several delegations to the conference of foreign ministers felt that an
agreement on the extradition of all persons accused of political terrorism would conflict with the provision of the 1954 Convention which provided: "It shall rest with the State granting asylum to determine the
104
This article
nature of the offense or the motives or the persecution."'
as
it chooses
asylum
offer
to
state
granting
the
of
sovereignty
affirmed the
by allowing the government to distinguish for itself "political" from
"common" crimes. 0 5

101. Id. The U.S. Representative to the O.A.S., recognizing the difficulty in brand-

ing political kidnapping a "common," rather than a "political" crime, declared

that he recognized the need "to distinguish between these criminal and unpardonable
acts [i.e., the kidnapping of foreign diplomatic officials] and the legitimate expression of discontent with injustice and of a desire for change prevalent in our hemis-

phere today." O.A.S. Asked to Consider Problem of Kidnapping and Terrorism:
Statement by Joseph John Jova, 62 DEm'T STATE BuLL. 662 (1970).
The United States practice has long been to distinguish the injury to a national

official of high rank in a foreign country from "political offenses," i.e., those crimes
excepted from extradition. Since the assassination of President Garfield, the United
States has customarily included in its extradition treaties a provision that actual or
attempted assassination of the President, certain other high officials, and members

of their families, shall not be deemed a "political offense." See generally 4 J. MooRE,
supra note 38, at 352 ff.
102. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1970, at 16, col. 8. Chile and Peru voted against the
draft; Mexico and Columbia abstained. Id.
103. The kidnapping of diplomatic personnel has aspects of both "common" and

"political" crimes. Neither term, however, is defined in the 1954 Convention, and may
or may not be covered under the terms of that Convention. The pertinent provision reads:
It is not lawful to grant asylum to persons who, at the time of requesting
it, are under indictment or on trial for common offenses or have been convicted by competent regular courts and have not served the respective sentence
.... save when the acts giving rise to the request for asylum, whatever the
case may be, are clearly of a political nature. (Emphasis added.)
1954 Convention, art. 3.
104. Id. Art. 4.
105. The view that such a conflict would arise was particularly prevalent among
those countries with left-leaning governments, e.g., Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and
Mexico. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1971, at 5, col. 1.
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Most of the other delegations, including the United States, desired a
more restricted convention covering only the kidnappings of diplomats
and foreign officials. On the other hand, this diluted version was unacceptable to several delegations that walked out of the Conference because the majority was unwilling to accept their demands for the adoption of the draft version requiring the extradition of all persons accused
of "political terrorism."' 106
The meeting, by one vote more than required for adoption, finally
approved the weakened convention. 107 In pertinent part, it provided:
For the purposes of this convention, kidnapping, murder, and other
assaults against the life or personal integrity of those persons to whom the
state has the duty to give special protection according to international law,
as well as extortion in connection with those crimes, shall be considered
common crimes of international significance, regardless of motive. 108
None of the provisions of this convention shall be interpreted so as to impair the right of asylum.' 09

Unfortunately, the instrument appears too weak to alleviate the problem which it addresses. Not only did it fail to meet with the approval of
ten of the twenty-three Western Hemisphere governments participating
in the conference, but it seems to conflict significantly with several provisions of the 1954 Convention." 0 Moreover, it should be noted that

106. These delegations represented, primarily, those countries under military-dominated regimes, and not coincidentally, included the nations most severely plagued by
terrorist activities- Brazil, Argetina, Paraguay, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Haiti. Id.
107. The final vote was 13-1, with Chile casting the negative vote, Peru and
Bolivia abstaining, and the six delegations listed in note 106, supra, not present at
the vote. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1971, at 2, col. 4. The slender margin by which the
convention was adopted is in contrast to the 22-0 vote (U.S. obstaining) by which
the foreign ministers decided to postpone discussion of the draft convention to hear
Ecuador's charge that the U.S. had violated the O.A.S. charter by suspending arms
sales in a dispute over fishing rights. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
108. Art. 2, Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the
Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International
Significance, signed Feb. 2, 1971, O.A.S. Doc. AG/88 rev. 1, 64 DEPT STATE BULL. 228,
231 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Convention on Terrorism]. On May 11, 1971, it was
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, together with a message from
President Nixon. See 65 DEP'T STATE BULL. 28 (1971).
109. Convention on Terrorism, art. 6.
Secretary of State Rogers noted a "general understanding" that Article 2, id.,
applies not only to diplomatic agents, consular officials, and members of their
families, but also to other officials of foreign governments and officials of public
international organizations. 64 DEr STATE BULL. 230.
110. See 1954 Convention, arts. 12, 4. In addition, Art. 2 of the 1954 Convention
provides, "Every state has the right to grant asylum." Art. 3 of the 1954 Convention
prohibits the grant of asylum for "common" as opposed to "political" crimes; but,
of course, the abductors of diplomats in every case have been motivated by clearly
political considerations.
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Cuba, which trains and exports most Latin American guerillas,111 did
not participate in the conference.
If adopted internationally, a pact of this nature would indeed make
the kidnapping of diplomats and other acts of terrorism meaningless,
but it would seem all but impossible to achieve the complete international cooperation necessary. After all, would Marxist countries refuse
shelter to those accused of activities on behalf of the Marxist revolution?
B. Increased Security Measures
Article 29 of the Vienna Convention, dealing with the personal inviolability of the diplomatic agent, directs the receiving state to take all
necessary precautions to protect the official, and, in accordance with this
mandate, a number of states have taken multiple measures to tighten
diplomatic security. For example, after a rash of seizures culminated in
bloodshed during the summer of 1970, the United States Department of
State sent all U.S. embassies in Latin America a directive calling for
drastic reductions in travel, secrecy in planning any essential trip, closer
cooperation with local security officers, and a tighter embassy guard." 2
Diplomatic personnel were also urged to change their daily routine, such
as the times they went to and from work, since guerillas generally study a
potential victim's habits before abducting him. Additionally, embassy
cars began to travel in convoys, picking up entire staffs at their homes
in the morning and returning them in the evening." 3
Reportedly, the size of the potential target was being reduced too,
by decreasing the size of embassy staffs. 1 4 However, the State Department has not yet withdrawn the dependents of remaining staff personnel,"15 and the measures listed above would appear to be of limited utility
so long as wives and children of diplomatic agents are present.XlO

111. Mexico recently violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the Convention on
Terrorism by flying to Cuba nine Mexican prisoners who sought asylum there, as

part of a deal to rescue the kidnapped rector of a Mexican state university. The
abduction was the first in Mexico in which the release of prisoners was demanded
in exchange for the hostage. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1971, at 13, col. 1.
112. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1970, at 3, col. 3.

113. Id.

114. Id.
115. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1970, at 3, col. 2.
116. Article 37, para. 1, of the Vienna Convention, supra note 27, provides that the
"members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household shall,
if they are not nationals of the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities
[of the diplomat himself]." Nationals of the receiving state forming part of the
diplomat's household (other than the diplomat himself) enjoy privildges and im-
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Another tactic being tested in fifteen Latin American countries is for
the state to improve the training of local police and their relations with
the public, thus helping to counter public unwillingness to cooperate
with police in capturing kidnappers." 7 Obviously, this plan is of dubious
short-run benefit; and, meanwhile, as one Brazilian terrorist notes
in describing how both passersby and police failed to intervene in a
diplomatic kidnapping taking place before their eyes: "One of our
advantages is that the police are not motivated against us. We are ready
8
to give up our lives, but they are not.""1

The Convention enacted at the 1971 meeting of Western Hemisphere
foreign ministers" 9 in pertinent part provides:
To cooperate in preventing and punishing the crimes contemplated, the
contracting states accept the following obligations:
a. To take all measures within their power, and in conformity with their
own laws, to prevent and impede the preparation in their respective territories of the crimes [of diplomatic kidnapping and extortion] that are to
be carried out in the territory of another contracting state.
b. To exchange information and consider effective administrative measures
for the purpose of protecting [foreign officials to whom protection is
owed]....
d. To endeavor to have the criminal acts contemplated in this convention
included in their penal laws, if not already so included.
e. To comply most expeditiously with the requests for extradition con2
cerning the criminal acts contemplated in this convention.1 0 "

The United States moved quickly to meet its obligation under this
provision, and on August 5, 1971, the Department of Justice and the
Department of State sent to Congress proposed legislation to provide
expanded protection against attacks on United States and foreign officials and their families which occur domestically. 121 In a letter accom-

munities "only to the extent admitted by the receiving State," however. Vienna Convention, art. 38, para. 2.
117. U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, Aug. 24, 1970, at 23.
118. de Gramont, supra note 71, at 138.
119. See notes 102-11 supra.
120. Convention on Terrorism, art. 8.
121. The joint announcement by the Departments of State and Justice and the
text of a letter submitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on August
5, 1971 by Secretary of State Rogers and Attorney General Mitchell are reprinted
at 65 DaP'r STATE BULL. 268 (1971).
Specifically, the proposal would expand 18 U.S.C. 112 (1970), see note 55 supra,
to make it a federal offense to assault, kill, kidnap, threaten or intimidate, or harass
foreign officials or members of their families. It would also become a federal crime
to damage or destroy the property of a foreign government or international organization, or to assault, kidnap or kill a federal employee acting in the line of duty,
because of their performance of duty, or because of their status as federal officials.
Id. See generally, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1971, at 2, col. 1.
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panying the proposed legislation, Attorney General Mitchell and Secretary of State Rogers noted:
Of late, express and implied threats of militant activists and terrorists to
commit acts of physical violence against the persons of members of the diplomatic corps, other foreign officials, and officials of the United States have
created grave concern in our respective Departments. The lesson from the
recent distressful experiences of other nations with terrorist seizures of
and governmental officials for use as pawns in 'political disputes'
diplomatic
122
is dear.

C. Adoption of a "Hard-Line"Policy
One means of combating the abduction of diplomatic and other foreign
officials already in practice on a limited scale is a decision by the diplomatic corps and certain governments that the demands of terrorists
would not be granted under any circumstances, even if it might mean
death for the hostage.' 2 3 Since the tactic of seizing diplomats for barter
did not become widespread until the successful ransoming of Ambassador
Elbrick in Brazil, 2 4 ostensibly, this policy would convince guerillas of
the unprofitability of this strategy.
At the recent meeting of the Organization of American States which
produced the Convention on Terrorism, the delegates agreed not to
incorporate such a policy in that agreement. 125 The United States delegation reported that: "It was the sense of the meeting that this delicate

decision should be left to the responsibility of the states concerned and
that no language need be included in the agreement on that point. The
26
United States Government supports this view."'

122. 65 DE,'T STATE BULL. at 269. Earlier in 1971, six persons, including Reverend
Philip Berrigan, were indicted on Federal charges of plotting to kidnap Henry A.
Kissinger, Presidential-advisor on national security affairs, and to blow up heating
systems of federal buildings in Washington, D.C. According to F.B.I. Director Hoover,
the plotters' purpose was to disrupt government operations, demand an end to the
war in Southeast Asia, and seek the release of all "political prisoners." N.Y. Times,
Jan. 13, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
123. Cogent defenses for this strategy are set forth in What to Do About Diplomat
Snatching?, 22 NAT'L REv. 397 (Apr. 21, 1970) See also O'Mara, supra note 59, at 519.
124. See note 63, supra, and accompanying text.
125. 64 DEP'T STATE BULL. 231. Of course, considering the wide variety of views as
to the acceptability of the Convention on Terrorism, see notes 105-07 supra, it would
probably have been impossible to reach agreement on how to deal with the terrorists once an abduction has taken place.
126. Id. United States policy has consistently been not to apply pressure to the
host government to negotiate with the terrorists for the release of kidnapped per-
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Nonetheless, Argentina, Uruguay, Guatemala, and Paraguay have already pledged not to bargain with kidnappers, whatever the cost in
human lives. 127 The U.S. State Department, apparently more concerned
with discouraging future kidnappings than protecting unfortunate captives, has also adopted a policy of "no tribute."' 28 The same determina129
tion has been made elsewhere.
This position, needless to add, is a risky one, requiring a good deal
of callousness on the part of decision-makers. Several slayings, in fact,
have already occurred immediately after the rejection of abductors' demands. 130 The "hard-line" policy may also overlook the fact that the
payment of ransom is frequently only secondary to the goal of embarrassing the government of the host state. 131 Even on the assumption,
however, that ransom is the primary objective of the guerillas, this policy
of firmness fails to consider that terrorists select their victims with
care."32

sonnel abroad. For example, during the March, 1971 crisis involving the four U.S.
airmen kidnapped in Turkey, see notes 71-72, supra, President Nixon stated:
. . . We've had [this) situation with several other governments, and I would
not suggest that the Turkish Government negotiate on this matter because I
believe that's a decision that that Government must make having in mind
its own internal situation.
Transcript of Presidential News Conference, N.Y. Times, Mar 4, 1971, at 12, col. 6.
127. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1970, at 3, col. 3.
128. Following the release of the four kidnapped airmen in Turkey, see notes 72-73,
supra, the U.S. State Department said the Administration had adopted a policy of
not paying ransom in cases of political kidnapping, noting: "Painful experience
has convinced the Government that payment of ransom to kidnappers would only
encourage terrorist groups to kidnap other Americans all over the world." N.Y. Times,
Mar. 9, 1971, at 14, col. 1. Prior to this statement of policy, a number of U.S. diplomatic agents abroad had reportedly left private instructions that if they were
kidnapped, their captors' demands were not to be met under any circumstances.
Time, Mar. 22, 1971, at 31.
129. For example, when British Trade Commissioner James Cross and Quebec
Minister of Labor Pierre Laporte were kidnapped by two different groups of FrenchCanadian separatists, supra note 65, the Canadian Government offered the kidnappers
free passage to Cuba and the broadcast of their "manifesto," but nothing more.
Though this firm policy resulted in the murder of Laporte, a Gallup poll released
after the incident revealed that Canadians supported by nearly 8 to I their government's decision. Time, Mar. 22, 1971, at 31.
130. See, e.g., note 62, supra (Ambassador von Spreti); note 65, supra (Minister
Laporte); note 66, supra (Consul-General Elrom,; and note 67, supra (U.S. Advisor
Mitrione).
131. See notes 68-72, supra. This policy does, however, reduce the potential political
gains for the terrorists. Not only is the flow of released prisoners to reinforce guerilla
ranks reduced, but the responsibility for the hostage's wellbeing, in the eyes of the
public, is shifted to the kidnappers. The Tupamaros, for example, lost a great deal
of popular support by murdering Dan Mitrione, supra note 67 and accompanying
text, a fact reflected by their overwhelming defeat in the subsequent Uruguayan
national elections. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1971, at 23, col. 1.
132. One urban guerilla in Brazil stated: "We only carried out kidnappings when
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Furthermore, it is possible that this position violates international
law. Arguably, it does not because, as noted, the implicit theoretical basis
for the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is most likely "functional necessity," which takes account of the security of the host state
in formulating the privileges and immunities of diplomats. 133 Thus, so
long as the receiving state takes "all appropriate steps to prevent any
attack on his person, freedom, or dignity"' 34 by maximizing the diplomat's personal security prior to an abduction, it has fulfilled its obligation. If a kidnapping unavoidably occurs after these steps have been
taken, the state need not jeopardize its internal security or the safety
of future victims by negotiating with the revolutionaries or complying
with their demands. This interpretation of the obligation of the host
state with regard to the diplomatic agent's personal inviolability is
bolstered by that paragraph of the Preamble to the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations which reads: "Realizing that the purpose of
such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to
ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions
as representing States . ."135
'. (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
Political kidnapping, while a thoroughly despicable tactic, is apparently a strategy of growing importance, endemic to countries squeezed by
leftist revolution and rightist reaction. Brutal, authoritarian repression
in response to the actions of the urban guerillas, however, only plays
into their hands, for their end objective is governmental repression so
severe as to provoke general discontent and, ultimately, revolution. The
only effective countermeasure is probably the outright rejection by host
states of what amounts to blackmail. While this is far from an ideal
solution, as evidenced by the deaths of innocent hostages, it offers the
best hope of eventually curbing political kidnapping, by gaining its practitioners little for their trouble.
Ira Stechel

we were fairly sure that our demands would be met. We chose diplomats from
countries on which Brazil is dependent and we knew the Minister of the Interior
was not in a position to adopt a tough stance." de Gramont, supra note 71, at 140.
133. See notes 48-53, supra, and accompanying text.

134. Vienna Convention, art. 29, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
135. Vienna Covention, fourth para. of Preamble, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.

